

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Indigeneity and the refusal of whiteness

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ABSTRACT

Drawing on international literature examining mismatch between racial appearance and racial identity, this paper analyses the subgroup of Indigenous Australians who have been identified, and self-identify, as 'light-', 'fair-', 'pale-' or 'white-skinned'. We utilise the term 'race discordance' to describe the experience of regularly being attributed an identity that is different from how one personally identifies. In contrast to existing terms such as elective race, ethnic fraud and transracialism, race discordance does not seek to explain or judge the validity of identity claims that do not match perceived appearance. When unnoticed or unchallenged, 'race discordance' corresponds to 'passing'. We propose the term 'race refusal' to describe instances when a person rejects the race they are ascribed to. In the case of white-skinned Indigenous Australians who are frequently assumed to identify as white, race refusal entails the refusal of whiteness. When light-skinned Indigenous people refuse whiteness, what are they refusing? In conversation with Audra Simpson's notion of refusal of state recognition as an assertion of continued Indigenous sovereignty, we find that these particular micro-politics of race refusal demand rather than negate state recognition. We argue that identity refusal by pale-skinned Aboriginal people acts to disrupt histories of assimilation, white sociality and everyday racialisation while simultaneously reinforcing Australian recognition regimes.

KEYWORDS

Indigenous, whiteness, Australia, refusal, assimilation, skin colour, race, postcolonial

Introduction: refusal, recognition and Indigenous identity

Since the civil rights movements of the 1960s, many liberal states have developed avenues for recognising minorities such as African-Americans and Indigenous people and granting them special rights (e.g. affirmative action and limited sovereignty, respectively) on the basis of historical oppression and dispossession or contemporary inequality. The last two decades have witnessed sustained critiques of the 'politics of recognition' on many grounds, from the tendency to essentialise group characteristics to the contingency of 'minority' rights as opposed to citizenship rights.[1] Of late, many scholars of Indigenous recognition are thinking about refusal. As an alternative to the concepts of both recognition and resistance, refusal denotes a positive project of affirming something otherwise to colonialism as usual. Prominent Native scholars, Audra Simpson and Glen Coulthard, have theorised refusal as a Native response of 'turning away' from state recognition rather than demanding it.[2]

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Drawing on ethnographic research with her own community, the Mohawks of Kahnawà:ke (on the outskirts of Montreal), Simpson illustrates refusal through descriptions of fellow Mohawks refusing to vote, pay taxes, or hold Canadian passports. Although severely impacted by colonisation, the political sovereignty of the Mohawks has not been ceded. Attempts by the settler state to recognise Indigenous people as a special category of Canadian citizens are therefore refused. This refusal unsettles the grounds of settler sovereignty, '[raising] the question of legitimacy for those who are usually in the position of recognizing: What is their authority to do so? Where does it come from? Who are they to do so?'[3] Here, acts of refusal serve as fundamental critiques of state recognition.

This article enquires into refusal and recognition on a different scale and from a different direction. Rather than official, bureaucratic forms of recognition like passports and electoral rolls, we focus on interpersonal recognition between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and non-Indigenous people in Australia. And rather than refusing to be recognised as an Indigenous minority in a settler state, as do Simpon and her ethnographic subjects, the Indigenous people of interest here refuse to be *white* and, through this refusal, *demand* to be recognised as Indigenous. As we will argue, identity refusal thus complicates any dichotomy between recognition and refusal and constitutes a 'middle ground' between them.[4]

We ask here: how do the micro-politics of race refusal among light-skinned Indigenous people relate to the refusal of settler recognition? In what ways, if any, does race refusal unsettle the state? By turning refusal upside down, as it were, we hope to deepen current analyses of recognition and refusal in settler states. A key departure from Simpson and Coulthard's treatments of refusal is that our focus is not on the refusal of citizenship, but the refusal of ascribed identity. Some initial remarks are in order, then, to explain the context of Indigenous identity claims in Australia.

There are myriad settings in which personal identity claims are judged, from North American tribal authorities to Australian native title representative bodies to various government departments, courts and workplaces.[5] In recent high-profile cases such as self-proclaimed 'black' women Rachel Dolezal, Native Studies scholar Andrea Smith, and Canadian novellist Joseph Boyden, judgement also takes place in the media and public sphere.[6] In general, identity claims are more likely to invite scrutiny when the physical appearance, dress, language, accent, history or status of the individual is incongruous with what the viewer expects. If the viewer is a typical member of the global North and the identity in question is Indigenous, their experience is likely to be limited to popular representations that will tend towards the stereotypical: in Australia, dark skin and eyes, particular facial features, cultural distinctiveness and low socio-economic status.[7]

People who defy expectations—expressed through an observer's passive misrecognition, active suspicion or anything in between—are likely to share the experience of having their identity claims questioned in certain contexts: are they *really* what they claim to be? In this article, our focus is on light-skinned people who identify as Indigenous but who are often taken as white by people they meet and encounter.[8] We focus on instances where Indigenous people who are assumed by others to be white reveal that they are Indigenous, placing these encounters in context of the literature on recognition and the settler state.

We have witnessed or directly experienced such situations many times. Throughout this paper we draw on published literature and our personal and professional experiences

in Indigenous settings. The first author identifies as a white Jewish-Polish Australian. She is a cultural anthropologist of Indigenous-white relations with previous experience as a medical doctor and public health researcher. The second author identifies as a white-skinned Anglo-Asian-Aboriginal Australian. He is the grandchild of a Stolen Generations member and has been identified as Aboriginal since birth.[9] He is a scholar of (anti-)racism who experiences both passing and refusal on a regular basis. Both authors have been engaged in Indigenous affairs since the 1990s.

To begin our inquiry into the refusal of light-skinned Indigenous people to be white, we share a vignette from early in the second author's career:

> On the third day of attending a conference on Indigenous health in Cairns, a small city in the north of Australia, with a range of Indigenous and non-indigenous delegates, I find myself travelling with several non-indigenous women in a 4WD to visit one of the nearby tourist destinations. In the front-seat, conversation among two work colleagues, well-known to each other, turns from idle chit-chat to criticism of certain churlish and hostile Indigenous people attending the event. Despite days of interaction and discussion so far, it dawns on me that they consider the rest of us in the backseat to be insiders on their conversation, i.e. fellow whites; an accurate assumption for everyone except me. When they ask for my view, I hesitate for a moment, unsure whether to express my opinion as 'one of them' or declare myself an 'outsider'. Opting for the later, I deploy the first-, instead of third-person, pronoun as I discuss the Indigenous colleagues in question. The silence is deafening for several seconds as comfort levels in the vehicle plummet. This is followed by the commonly heard refrain: 'But you don't look Indigenous?', delivered in a surprised and curious tone. The conversation then turned to a congenial discussion of Indigenous identity itself, in which my colleagues sought to enhance their understanding of this topic by positioning me as the 'expert'.[10]

This interaction has many characteristics we have experienced as typical in such encounters. A social space assumed by non-Indigenous people to be white (in this case, occupants in a car) is disrupted when a light-skinned Indigenous person discloses that they are Indigenous. Here the disclosure occurs subtly, through the use of first-person pronouns—'we' and 'us'—that include the speaker in the category of Indigenous. Once his indigeneity is disclosed, the social space is dramatically altered and acutely uncomfortable (albeit briefly) while the non-Indigenous people readjust to the identity of the person they took to be white. In this moment, a space of sociality we define in this article as 'white'—that is, sociality among exclusively white people—becomes a social space we define here as 'intercultural'—meaning, in this case, sociality between white people and one or more Indigenous people.

After the experience described, the non-Indigenous people in the car may have learnt to be more careful when ascribing indigeneity and non-indigeneity to people they do not know well. Many non-Indigenous people we have had contact with in our careers would never assume someone is *not* Indigenous. People who are not known to the viewer are assumed to be 'potentially Indigenous'[11] until further information is obtained. Indigenous status is often inferred through careful conversation that provides opportunities for the potentially Indigenous person to mention their Indigenous family, language or community, or to use first-person pronouns when talking about Indigenous people (as in the vignette above). If the non-Indigenous person is still uncertain, a general question such as 'How did you come to work in Indigenous health?' is useful to prompt the potentially Indigenous person to clarify their Indigenous status. If the questioner is still in doubt, the more probing but still indirect 'What is your background?' will usually clear up the matter.

As a non-Indigenous person working in Indigenous affairs, the first author is also sometimes taken as potentially Indigenous by people who meet her for the first time.[12] Most will take the more subtle path of asking 'how did you come to work in this field?' or 'what is your background?', though some will ask directly, 'are you Indigenous?' The first author perceives that when non-Indigenous questioners realise she is not Indigenous, they are usually both disappointed and relieved: disappointed that she cannot offer the insights of an Indigenous person but simultaneously relieved that the higher level of self-monitoring required for intercultural social spaces is not necessary.

This brief introduction into the micro-politics of racial identification among those living and working in Indigenous Australia frames our inquiry into a phenomenon we call 'race discordance'—instances when someone's personal identity differs from the identity they are usually attributed by people they encounter. As we explain in more detail below, an instance of race discordance can result in 'passing'—when the discordance is not disclosed—or alternately, 'refusal'. This article focuses on the latter, when the light-skinned person who is assumed to be white discloses that they, in fact, are Indigenous. In the process, he or she refuses to be white.

As we have foreshadowed above and will return to below, the refusal of whiteness departs from Simpson and Coulthard's notion of refusal because (1) the scale of refusal is interpersonal rather than institutional[13] and (2) regimes of recognition are not overturned. On the contrary, regimes of recognition are reinforced by the refusal of whiteness. Explaining this discrepancy requires an understanding of the politics and patterns of Indigenous identification and recognition in Australia.

Indigenous diversity and ethnographic refusal

In Australia, diversity among Indigenous peoples has increased significantly over more than two centuries of social contact between Indigenous people and settlers, both violent and consensual, and partly regulated by government policies and intervention concerning marriage and the care of Indigenous children.[14] Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Aboriginal Australians were divided into 'full bloods', 'half-castes', 'quarter castes' and 'octoroons', with different laws and policies applied depending on this classification.[15]

This history includes what has become known as the 'stolen generations', in which light-skinned children of mixed race were removed from their families, ostensibly for their own good, and placed in institutions where many experienced abuse.[16] It also includes high rates of inter-marriage between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians (74% in 2011) and equally high rates of 'Indigeneity transmission'—a demographic term for cases where children of 'mixed unions' are identified, or identify themselves, as Indigenous.[17] In addition, increasing social acceptance and positive images of Indigenous people has led those not previously identifying as Indigenous (including those who discover previously unknown Indigenous ancestry) to change their identification, reflected in large increases in the Indigenous population in the 1990s and 2000s.[18] As a result of these factors, the Indigenous population is highly diverse in terms of beliefs, cultural practices, language, level of western education, affluence and physical appearance, with the vast majority of Indigenous Australians descended from both colonised and colonising ancestors.[19]

Although the diversity of the Indigenous population is uncontestable, academic scholarship on intra-racial diversity is notably lacking, particularly when compared to literature on African-American diversity in the United States. For example, there is no Australian counterpart to scholarship on 'colorism' that documents how lighter-skinned African-Americans are advantaged in education, employment and health status relative to African-Americans with darker skin.[20]

This lack of literature on intra-racial diversity in Australia relates to the political formation of pan-indigeneity, dominant since the late 1960s. At this time, Indigenous activists began to argue that all people of Indigenous descent who self-identified as such were equally Indigenous, vigorously opposing views that people with less Indigenous ancestry were not authentic.[21] Since the 1980s, pan-indigeneity has been adopted within government and non-government organisations, with indigeneity widely recognised if three necessary elements are present: self-identification, descent from an Indigenous person, and community acceptance. 'Degree' or 'amount' of descent is not relevant, and, in contrast to the United States,[22] Australian Indigenous people do not usually disclose, and may not even be aware of, their degree of descent.[23] For example, when asked by a white researcher about being Indigenous and her cultural background, a young Aboriginal person replied: 'I'm just gonna say that I'm an Aboriginal person, I'm Koori, and that's it. That's all youse [you people] need to know'.[24] Indigenous status is self-identified in the national census and administrative collections, and 'community acceptance' is loosely applied in comparison with tribal (in the United States) or iwi (in New Zealand) enrolment, with any one of thousands of Aboriginal organisations able to provide 'confirmation of Aboriginality'. Such evidence of 'community acceptance' is required only if an Indigenous person wants to access Indigenous-specific services (e.g. scholarships and low interest loans).

The political formation of pan-indigeneity has meant that Indigenous people who have hybrid identities can engender reproach.[25] One example is found in the 2002 documentary Black Chicks Talking by prominent Aboriginal filmmaker and actor Leah Purcell. In the documentary, Purcell interviews Kathryn Hay, an Aboriginal politician and former model who identifies as 'part-Aboriginal'. From her position behind the camera Purcell chides Hay for identifying in this way, saying 'which part of you is Aboriginal?' Eventually, Hay agrees that she is completely Aboriginal.[26] Hay sought to identify as Indigenous in a way that reflected her ancestry, upbringing and her view of indigeneity. Purcell, however, disapproved of Hay's mode of identification because her emphasis on mixed ancestry threatened pan-indigeneity and evoked the caste system of the assimilation era.[27] As Martin Nakata has argued in his analysis of contemporary indigeneity in Australia, 'while "dual" or "mixed" heritage is accepted, an individual's primary political and cultural identification must be demonstrably Indigenous'.[28]

One effect of pan-indigeneity has been a form of 'ethnographic refusal' in Sherry Ortner's sense of the term.[29] Ortner coined the term in 1995 as a critique of 1990s scholarship on resistance. In her view, this field of literature tended to overlook complex power relations within subordinate groups in order to depict them as entirely virtous. A similar politics goes some way towards explaining why light-skinned Indigenous people have been largely overlooked by academics, as analysis of this group risks being co-opted by those who seek to question their identity claims. While we recognise the merit of this concern, we believe it is important to respectfully analyse light-skinned indigeneity as it

is a common and growing phenomenon in contemporary Indigenous Australia. In our attempt to do this here, we add to the few existing articles on light-skinned Indigenous people in relation to experiences of racism,[30] strategic whiteness as passing[31] and identity politics.[32]

For Indigenous people whose mixed heritage is reflected in white skin, demonstrating their indigeneity usually involves a refusal to be white. In the balance of this paper we ask: when an Indigenous person refuses whiteness, what do they refuse? We first clarify the terms we use in this article and compare them to similar terms in the literature. This allows us to more carefully delineate the questions at stake and their significance for the existing literature on recognition. We then explore how everyday instances of race refusal by white-skinned Indigenous people might unsettle the settler colonial state, and question what this means for analyses of recognition and refusal.

Race discordance, passing and refusal

There are many overlapping terms in circulation for the intra- and interracial interactions of interest in this article. We utilise the concept of 'race discordance' as an umbrella term for a discrepancy between the external attribution of race and personal racial identity.[33] This particular term derives from health and social research where it was initially used to indicate a difference in race between two people,[34] but has more recently been used to denote a mismatch between personal identification and socially attributed or ascribed race,[35] a usage we follow in this paper. Those who experience racial discordance are liable to have their racial identity wrongly ascribed by others. We use the term 'misrecognition' to refer to this experience as it describes the inaccuracy of the recognition—one is not seen as who one 'really' is.[36]

'Race discordance' is related to several other terms in current circulation. For example, 'elective race' is proposed by United States law scholar Camille Rich to describe people who identify as a racial minority in some contexts and not others, and may elect to withhold information about their personal race from employers or co-workers. Those in a position to electively identify their race are likely to be mixed race and/or 'phenotypically ambiguous'. Such people 'occupy the margins of racial categories, and [seek to] control the deployment of race definitions and the terms on which their bodies are assigned racial meaning'.[37] In our terms, they experience race discordance when asserting a personal identity that clashes with how they are perceived by others.

'Race shifting' was coined by Circe Sturm to describe people who have an identity and appearance as white, but discover non-white ancestry (in Sturm's research, Cherokee ancestry) and subsequently cultivate that identity.[38] This phenomenon has also been described in Indigenous Australia,[39] and a proportion of those who experience race discordance will fall into this category.

We use 'passing' to refer to incidences of race discordance that are not disclosed to, or challenged by, an observer. The existing literature on passing is usually restricted to instances where the presumed identity is majority/dominant compared to the personal identity (e.g. a person of African descent passing as white). The term 'ethnic fraud', however, is reserved for people who 'wrongfully' claim non-white ancestry and identity with minimal or no descent,[40] for example, a white person passing as Indigenous. Transracialism is a term derived from interracial adoption that has been used to describe people

who change their racial identification from either white to non-white (e.g. Rachel Dolezal) or non-white to white (e.g. Michael Jackson), often without having any descent from the destination race.[41] Rhetorically, it is the opposite of ethnic fraud, implying that choosing race regardless of ancestry is legitimate and equivalent to changing other aspects once seen as non-mutable, principally gender, but also religion and sexuality. However, the concepts of ethnic fraud and transracialism are of limited relevance here, as our focus is on people who identify as Indigenous and have Indigenous ancestry, and are thus accepted by the Australian state that uses a three-part definition of indigeneity: ancestry, self-identification and community acceptance.[42]

Here, is it important to note that while contestations over membership of minority and Indigenous groups are key sites of struggle, and, clearly, those who claim an identity with no corresponding ancestry, such as Dolezal, are highly controversial, for the purposes of our argument, we *do not seek to adjudicate the validity of personal racial identities*.[43] For this reason, we consider here events of race mismatch that occur between light-skinned Indigenous people and non-Indigenous people, rather than instances of misrecognition involving light-skinned Indigenous people and other Indigenous people. In this latter instance, the validity of the light-skinned person's claim to indigeneity may be undermined: an important topic for research but one outside the scope of this article.

It must be emphasised that both personal and socially attributed race are highly contextual. Someone who is potentially racially discordant because their appearance (or some other feature) does not match expected stereotypes of that identity may never experience race discordance if their predominant contacts are family, friends and neighbours who know them well and do not experience their physical appearance as discordant (e.g. in a small community). If someone's personal identity shifts over time or according to context, race discordance will only be experienced when their personal identity is discordant with their socially attributed identity. Whether personal identity is stable through time or in constant flux, those who regularly have contact with people they do not know (e.g. through travel, work or education) are more likely to experience race discordance. Evidence suggests that race discordance affects almost one in five Indigenous people. The 2012–2013 National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Survey reports that almost 92,000 Indigenous Australians (17% of the total Indigenous population) are known as Indigenous among most people they 'mix' with, but are recognised as Indigenous by few people they meet for the first time.[44]

While experiencing race discordance can, at times, be distressing, it can also be a trivial event. Someone who identifies as Indigenous and is taken as white by an observer may be oblivious to it, welcome it in certain situations, or be aware but indifferent to how others perceive them.[45] In such instances, the white-skinned Indigenous person is likely to benefit from white privilege via a passive form of 'passing'. Despite a plethora of scholarship on passing,[46] there is scant literature focused on situations in which race discordance is challenged. In contrast to the complicity with attributed race involved in passing, we propose the term 'race refusal' for instances where a person defies an attributed identity that clashes with their personal identity.

Such events can take place in a wide variety of circumstances, each with their own valence and potentialities. Race refusal may occur during a casual conversation with an acquaintance, in the course of seeking services, or at workplaces and within educational settings. A white-skinned Indigenous person, for example, may actively refuse whiteness

through their own actions, or passively when someone else identifies them (e.g. when they are introduced to a group as Indigenous). Further, an 'active' refusal can be subtle. In the Maori context, those Maori who have white skin, blue eyes and fair hair are called 'white herons' by other Maori (not as a pejorative term). As they are not recognisable as Maori to those who do not know them, they 'find other ways of activating and performing their Indigeneity in the course of interactions with others',[47] such as wearing identifiably 'Indigenous' jewelry or using specific linguistic cues.[48]

Race refusal can induce a range of responses in those who are confronted with it: surprise, interest, embarrassment (at assuming the white-skinned person is not Indigenous), incredulity, denial or anger resulting in verbal abuse or even physical violence. The concept of race refusal encompasses the experience of having one's personal race misrecognised, followed by either active or passive refusal. Thus, race refusal is relational and interactional.

In public and Indigenous discourse about white-skinned Indigenous people, the most common response to misrecognition among Indigenous people and their allies is to reiterate the Indigeneity of those who are wrongly interpellated as white: we/they *are* Indigenous (despite appearances). The correction of misrecognition always has two parts: (1) I am what I am and (2) I am not what you think I am. What happens if critical attention is shifted away from the insistence on recognition as Indigenous (i.e. what I am) towards the refusal of whiteness (i.e. what I am not) – we/they are *not* white, despite appearances? What ensues when an attribution of whiteness is refused?

Refusing whiteness, demanding recognition

Putting the question another way, when a white-skinned Indigenous person refuses to be white, what do they refuse? Unlike Simpson's account of refusal, light-skinned Indigenous people do not refuse recognition. Rather, they demand it through their refusal of whiteness. Refusal emerges here not as the rejection of recognition regimes, but as the means to correct misrecognition and claim rightful recognition by the state and its citizens. However, we see at least three things that *are* refused in the act of claiming indigeneity: assimilation, white sociality and everyday racialisation.

When a light-skinned Indigenous person identifies as Indigenous, they refuse to concede the historical state project of assimilation.[49] The national goal of assimilating the so-called *half-castes* into the white population was proposed from the inter-war period, when it became obvious that the population of mixed race Aboriginal people was increasing.[50] A paradigmatic statement of biological assimilation was uttered by the infamous Western Australian Commissioner for Native Affairs and key assimilationist thinker, A.O. Neville, in 1937: 'Are we going to have a population of one million blacks in the Commonwealth or are we going to merge them into our white community and eventually forget that there were any aborigines in Australia?'[51] Public intellectuals imagined a future when all Australians would have Indigenous ancestry, and would be no less white for it.[52]

The social and demographic changes of the last half-century have constituted a partial realisation of Neville's vision in that the Indigenous population has merged somewhat with white (and non-white) communities, particularly in urban Australia. But rather than identifying as white, the majority of the children of mixed marriages are identified

by their parents, and later identify themselves, as Indigenous.[53] In addition, some of those who are not raised with an Indigenous identity but later discover they have Indigenous ancestry are drawn to identify and build social ties with Indigenous relatives or the Indigenous community where they live or work.[54] According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics,[55] Neville's prediction of a 'million blacks' in Australia will occur by 2030. But in a reversal of Neville's imagined future, although many of them will have white skin, they will be no less 'Black' for it.

For some, especially those who are members of the Stolen Generations or their descendants, white skin is also a badge of identification with the suffering caused by forced assimilation. Maintaining their Indigenous identity is a form of defiance and survival.[56] Indigenous activist Celeste Liddle illustrates this view in a blog demonstrating both the suffering and resolve of light-skinned Aboriginal people:

> Recently my brother, at my father's birthday, delivered a speech where he gave the first paragraph in Arrernte. I cannot not tell you how that felt. For two generations children in my family were denied the right to speak language because they were wards of the state and here's my brother, at nearly 30 years old, reclaiming this language so that his siblings and his son are not also denied it. It's for these reasons that you see so many fairer skinned Aboriginal people fighting so damn hard to reclaim language, family and culture. By virtue of skin colour many were denied these things.[57]

When white-skinned Indigenous people refuse to be white, they are refusing the goals of the assimilation era and celebrating its failure. Despite other racial identifications potentially available to them based on ancestry and/or cultural upbringing, they refuse to forget their Indigenous heritage or dilute its relevance in their lives.

In this way, race refusal shares some elements of Simpson's notion of refusal. Like those who refuse the state, light-skinned Aboriginal people refuse to disappear and refuse to be eliminated. They refuse to 'let go of, or forget, or cease to enact: their relatedness to their place, to others, to a particular history, to their ongoing experiences because of this relatedness'. In the face of routine misrecognition, they refuse to disown, attenuate or forgo ties to a history, culture and experience they value. The state project of 'homogenizing heterogeneity' has failed to homogenise some of those who appear phenotypically white.[58]

Second, following from this, race refusal is a refusal of white sociality. As the vignette we began with illustrates, when a person who is presumed to be white (by other whites) reveals their indigeneity, the encounter radically shifts from a space of exclusively white sociality to a much more precarious intercultural space between whites and Indigenous people. In another example of this dynamic, an academic who was perceived by her students as white declared her Native American identity halfway through a semester. Her act of disclosure left 'minority students visibly relaxed' while white students 'straightened up in their chairs', with eyes wide.[59]

In the moment someone identifies as Indigenous, those who have misrecognised the Indigenous person as white are disorientated by their mistake. In some cases, their first response will be to establish the ambiguity of the Indigenous person's phenotype. The comment from the opening vignette—'But you don't look Indigenous'—is an example. Another is the frequent responses of denial and disbelief experienced by white-skinned Toronto Natives recorded by Lawrence: 'Oh, you don't look native' was typical.[60] Many would read these comments as questioning the authenticity of the Indigenous person.

Within this interpretation, the text and subtext of the comment would be: 'you don't look Aboriginal, *so you are not really Aboriginal*'.[61] However, in our experience with people that work in Indigenous affairs, the person who has misrecognised someone as white does not usually intend to question the Indigenous person's identification. On the contrary, they are often eager to recognise someone as Indigenous once they have identified themselves. Rather, such a comment reflects an instinct to avoid blame for the misrecognition: 'you don't look Aboriginal, *so my failure to recognise your indigeneity was understandable*'. Of course, regardless of the intention of the comment, the effect is to cast doubt on someone's indigeneity and reinforce stereotypical perceptions of what an Indigenous person 'should' look like.

There is more to race refusal than the embarrassment of realising a mistake has been made. Whiteness studies has long told us that white privilege works through its invisibility.[62] In the moment the seemingly white person becomes Indigenous, something else happens too: the whiteness of the non-Indigenous person becomes visible. It is a whiteness that is stigmatised by its *non*-indigeneity, *settler*-ness, colonial heritage and connotations of oppression.[63] The continuing history of racism and marginalisation invades the now-interracial space. White sociality is thus disturbed in multiple ways when an Indigenous person refuses to be white.

Third, and related to the previous two points, a disclosure of pale-skinned indigeneity is a refusal of everyday racialisation. As Lawrence puts it, race refusal among white-skinned Natives in Toronto 'buck[s] the tide of common-sense racial identification, one of the foundational aspects of a white supremacist society'.[64] Observers are denied the privilege of reading race from the body of the observed, and faced with the accusation that they have misread the signs.

At this point, the difference between Simpson's refusal and the refusal of whiteness becomes clearer. For Simpson, Mohawk refusal of Canadian state recognition is aimed at undermining the authority of the state, at least discursively. For those Indigenous people who refuse racial identification as white, a parallel aim would be to undermine the system of racial identification. This would be a 'post-racial'[65] move, advocating for the decoupling of identity from both race and the body. Such a project would be encouraged by those who engage in 'race defiance'[66] or for 'racial liminals' who are 'conscientious objectors' to the system of racial classification itself.[67]

However, in our experience the remedy proposed for the misrecognition of light-skinned Indigenous people is not to abandon the recognition of race altogether. Rather, the cure is to recognise *differently*, based on Indigenous ancestry and self-identification, not appearance. The recognition of white-skinned Indigenous people requires the observer to recalibrate the lens through which they assess Indigeneity. For those who wish to accommodate white-skinned Indigeneity, it is necessary to deduce Indigeneity from subtle cues or via direct enquires, rather than making assumptions. Through experiences of misrecognising Indigenous people and suffering the embarrassment that follows, non-Indigenous people who engage in Indigenous affairs learn how to better read the signs. It follows that the 'refusal of everyday racialisation' we describe here is thus simultaneously a refusal of racialisation (as white) and a *demand* for racialisation (as Indigenous).

The form of refusal of interest in this article is thus ambiguous and limited. In Simpson's and Coulthard's accounts, refusal is foundational to Indigenous sovereignty. By 'turning away' from the state, Natives 'avert one's gaze and refuse the recognition

itself',[68] ensuring that the dispossesive logic of settler nationhood is not forgotten. But for white-skinned Aboriginal people, to refuse the gaze is not to turn away, but to subvert it while still holding it. The mutual gaze of white sociality is disrupted by indigeneity, but not entirely repudiated.

On the one hand, this is a forceful interruption. Like state refusal, race refusal 'fundamentally interrupts and casts into question the story that settler states tell about themselves',[69] principally, the historical narrative that indigeneity can be assimilated into white society and forgotten. In foregrounding the ever-present potential of indigeneity lurking in every social interaction, white-skinned Indigenous people unsettle otherwise secure settler spaces.

On the other hand, although interrupted, the settler gaze quickly recovers. The white-skinned Indigenous person is re-classified and re-racialised as Indigenous. The non-Indigenous person learns how to better detect indigeneity and is not as easily caught out by a false sense of all-white sociality. Rather than relying on physical appearance, characteristic dress or jewelry, in the future the white person will use subtler means to assess the ever-present possibility of indigeneity and never assume that someone is *not* Indigenous before careful attention to discursive clues has clarified the matter.

In effect, identity refusal brings non-Indigenous practices of Indigenous attribution into line with state recognition practices that have been in place since the 1980s. We refer again to Australia's three-part working definition: descent (of any amount), self-identification and community acceptance. Of these three aspects, non-Indigenous people can only rely, in practice, on self-identification to identify Indigenous people. Ultimately, replacing appearance with self-identification as 'the bedrock of collective identity'[70] may do little to alter the plot of settler recognition. Refusing whiteness is not a refusal of Australian recognition regimes but a demand for inclusion in them under different terms.

Conclusion

The refusal of whiteness by light-skinned Indigenous people could be interpreted as a 'middle ground' between refusal and recognition. Rather than the sharp relief between recognition and refusal depicted by Simpson, the case outlined in this article sees recognition and refusal as mutually constitutive.

Some would interpret our analysis as a category error. Such a critique would say that the refusal of whiteness we have described is not an authentic refusal, but merely recognition in another guise. In response, we would say that such a reading retains the strong dichotomy between recognition and refusal but misses the potential insights of a 'middle ground' approach. We advocate reading the refusal of whiteness as a cautionary tale. First, this tale teaches us to remain alert to how refusal can be co-opted by the state. We concur that our example of identity refusal is well within the capacity of the 'cunning' of recognition to transform Indigenous people into governable subjects of late liberalism.[71] However, we caution readers who might respond to this by feeling reassured that their own cases of refusal are 'genuine' in comparison to ours. Instead, we hope that readers take this as an opportunity to ponder how mutable liberal recognition regimes can be. Our point is that we must remain skeptical about any political strategy that claims to reach 'outside' the state.

The second lesson to be gleaned from the 'middle ground' approach is the corollary of this: even where refusal appears minor, trivial or co-opted, it is important not to underestimate its potential in reconfiguring social relations. As Carole McGranahan asks, can such a 'rearrangement of relations rather than an ending of them' be 'a generative act'? If refusal succeeds in 'redirect[ing] levels of engagement'—critiquing social relations and forging new ones—it may contain the seeds of transformation even as it pushes the bounds of recognition without breaking them.[72]

Notes

1. See, for example, Elizabeth Povinelli, *The Cunning of Recognition: Indigenous Alterities and the Making of Australian Multiculturalism*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002; Patchen Markell, *Bound by Recognition*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003; and Wendy Brown, *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.
2. Audra Simpson, *Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014 and Glen S Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition, Indigenous Americas*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014.
3. Simpson, *Mohawk Interruptus*, p 11.
4. We are grateful to Samantha Balaton-Chrimes and Victoria Stead for suggesting this formulation. See Introduction, this issue.
5. The tensions between state or public definitions of Indigeneity and definitions and processes used by Indigenous organisations have been explored by Kirsty Gover, but are outside the scope of this article. Kirsty Gover, 'Indigenous Membership and Human Rights: When Self-identification Meets Self-constitution', in *Routledge Handbook of Indigenous Peoples' Rights*, Corrine Lennox and Damien Short (eds), Abingdon: Routledge, 2013, pp 35–48.
6. Rachel Dolezal, a black rights activist and part time African-American Studies professor in Washington State was the subject of international attention in 2015 when her parents revealed that their daughter, who was raised white with various European ancestries had been passing as a black woman for the past seven years, altering her hair and skin colour to do so. Andrea Smith is a Native Studies scholar whose identity as Cherokee was long questioned within the Native Studies community. In 2015, Cherokee genealogists who Smith had consulted, publicly stated she had no Cherokee ancestry, although she continues to identify as Cherokee. Joanne Barker, Jodi A Byrd, Jill Doerfler, Lisa Kahaleole Hall, LeAnne Howe, J Kēhaulani Kauanui, Jean O'Brien, Kathryn W Shanley, Noenoe K Silva, Shannon Speed, Kim TallBear and Jacki Thompson Rand, *Open Letter From Indigenous Women Scholars Regarding Discussions of Andrea Smith*, 2015. Available at: http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2015/07/07/open-letter-indigenous-women-scholars-regarding-discussions-andrea-smith (accessed 2 February 2016). Joseph Boyden defended his identification as Indigenous after multiple First Nations communities questioned his heritage.
7. Yin C Paradies, 'Beyond Black and White: Essentialism, Hybridity and Indigeneity', *Journal of Sociology* 42(4), 2006, pp 355–367.
8. There is no consensus on the correct term to use for this subgroup of Indigenous people, partly because, as we discuss below, the political formation of pan-indigeneity has discouraged progressives from identifying them as a distinct group. From our reading of media coverage and literature, the term 'fair-skinned' may be the most common term used by Indigenous people, probably because it is seen to deflect critiques of the authenticity of such people. However, in this paper we use the term '*white*-skinned Indigenous person' among other terms as this is the most salient word given our focus on the misrecognition of these people as white. Also, a related emerging phenomenon that we do not have the

space to consider here, but which deserves analysis, is the increasing distinction in Australia, particularly among younger people, between those who identify as simply being Indigenous and those who identify as being of Indigenous 'ancestry' or 'descent'.

9. As discussed later in this article, the 'Stolen Generations' is a term used for Indigenous children of mixed descent who were removed from their families for a variety of reasons across most of the twentieth century. Many were subject to abuse in the institutions or non-Indigenous families where they grew up.
10. Second author's experience circa late 1990s.
11. Emma Kowal, *Trapped in the Gap: Doing Good in Indigenous Australia*, New York: Berghahn, 2015.
12. To clarify, we believe they ask not because the first author has particular physical features that suggest indigeneity, but because the questioner does not want to make the same social error as the vignette depicts.
13. In saying this, we recognise that the scales of 'interpersonal' and 'institutional' are closely intertwined.
14. Katherine Ellinghaus, *Taking Assimilation to Heart: Marriages of White Women and Indigenous Men in the United States and Australia, 1887–1937*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006 and Ann McGrath, *Illicit Love: Interracial Sex and Marriage in the United States and Australia*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015.
15. Note that the way the 'assimilation era' is remembered tends to simplify its complex policy and practice dimensions. See Russell McGregor, *Indifferent Inclusion: Aboriginal People and the Australian Nation*, Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2011; Henry Reynolds, *An Indelible Stain? The Question of Genocide in Australia's History*, Ringwood: Viking, 2001; and Tim Rowse, 'Introduction: Contesting Assimilation' in *Contesting Assimilation*, Tim Rowse (ed), Perth: API Network, 2005, pp 1–24.
16. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, *Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families*, Canberra: Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 1997.
17. Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Census of Population and Housing: Understanding the Increase in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Counts*, Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013.
18. Two large increases far in excess of natural population increase were observed over the intercensual time periods 1991–1996 (33%) and 2006–2011 (21%). Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Census of Population and Housing*, 2013.
19. Here we interpret 'colonising' as British ancestry, which represents the largest portion of non-Indigenous ancestry within Indigenous Australia, although many non-British ancestries are also common among Indigenous people, including other European and Asian ancestries. For example, see Fariza Fozdar and Maureen Perkins, 'Antipodean Mixed Race: Australia and New Zealand' in *Global Mixed Race*, Rebecca C King-O'Riain, Stephen Small, Minelle Mahtani, Miri Song, and Paul Spickard (eds), New York: New York University Press, 2014, pp 119–143.
20. Margaret Hunter, 'The Persistent Problem of Colorism: Skin Tone, Status, and Inequality', *Sociology Compass*, 1(1), 2007, pp 237–254 and Ellis P Monk Jr, 'The Cost of Color: Skin Color, Discrimination, and Health among African-Americans', *American Journal of Sociology* 121(2), 2015, pp 396–444.
21. Jeremy Beckett, *Encounters with Indigeneities: Writing about Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples*, Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2014; Kevin Gilbert, *Because a White Man'll Never Do It*, Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1973; McGregor, *Indifferent Inclusion*. Although at a tribal level in the United States and other places, descent is used to include and exclude members. Jessica R Catelino, *High Stakes: Florida Seminole Gaming and Sovereignty*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008 and Josephine Johnston, 'Resisting a Genetic Identity: The Black Seminoles and Genetic Tests of Ancestry', *Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics* 31(2), 2003, pp 262–271.

22. J Kēhaulani Kauanui, *Hawaiian Blood: Colonialism and the Politics of Sovereignty and Indigeneity*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008 and Kim TallBear, *Native American DNA: Tribal Belonging and the False Promise of Genetic Science*, St. Paul: University of Minnesota Press, 2013.
23. Instead, Indigenous people often disclose which first- or second-degree relative identifies as Indigenous (e.g. father or grandmother) and, if known, which language group or specific Indigenous community they identify with. The social unacceptability of blood quantum is illustrated by Greg Lehman, who initially disclosed that he was '1/64th Aboriginal' but came to regret this as an unsophisticated understanding that did not capture what he meant. Caroline Overington, 'Not So Black and White', *The Australian*, 24 March 2012.
24. Alison Nelson, '"You don't have to be black skinned to be black": Indigenous Young People's Bodily Practices', *Sport, Education and Society* 17(1), 2012, pp 57–75.
25. Paradies, 'Beyond Black and White'.
26. Catherine Keenan, 'Blood Sisters', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 26 August 2002, p 2 and Leah Purcell, *Black Chicks Talking*, Lindfield, NSW: Film Australia, 2002.
27. Anthony Dillon is one of a small number of Indigenous commentators who openly contest pan-indigeneity by identifying as 'part-Aboriginal'. He describes as 'nonsense' the view that to do so is offensive and inappropriate. Dillon cited in Bronwyn Carlson, J Berglund, Michelle Harris, and Evan S Te Ahu Poata-Smith, 'Four Scholars Speak to Navigating the Complexities of Naming in Indigenous Studies', *The Australian Journal of Indigenous Education* 43(1, Special Issue), 2014, pp 58–72. The issue of light-skinned indigeneity has become more prominent since 2011 when conservative Australian commentator Andrew Bolt was found to have been racially discriminatory against a group of light-skinned Indigenous people by questioning their indigeneity in the media. As Kowal has explored, the ruling bolsters pan-indigeneity, by finding that questioning the authenticity of light-skinned Indigenous people is discriminatory. It the process, it simultaneously challenges pan-indigeneity through the legal and social recognition that the experiences of white-skinned Indigenous people are distinct from those of Indigenous people who are not racially discordant. Emma Kowal, 'Descent, Classification and Indigeneity in Australia' in *Mixed Race Identities in Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands*, Farida Fozdar and Kirsten McGavin (eds), London: Routledge, 2016, pp 19–35.
28. Martin Nakata, 'Identity Politics: Who Can Count as Indigenous?' in *The Politics of Identity: Emerging Indigeneity*, Michelle Harris, Martin Nakata, and Bronwyn Carlson (eds), Sydney: UTSePress, 2013, p 137.
29. Sherry B Ortner, 'Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 37(1), 1995, pp 173–193.
30. Bindi Bennett, 'Developing Identity as a Light-skinned Aboriginal Person with Little or No Community and/or Kinship Ties', PhD Thesis, Australian Catholic University, 2016 and Jean Boladeras, '"It's Easier to be Black if You're Black": Issues of Aboriginality for Fair-complexioned Nyungar People', Master of Arts (Indigenous Research and Development) thesis, Centre for Aboriginal Studies, Curtin University of Technology, 2002.
31. Dennis R McDermott, 'Ghassan's Gran and My Mother: Strategic Whiteness among Aboriginal Australians and Immigrant "others"', *Balayi: Culture, Law & Colonialism* 6, 2004, pp 31–40.
32. Paradies, 'Beyond Black and White'.
33. Our use of the word 'race' follows the United States literature that recognises the reality of race as a social phenomenon. We recognise that the term 'ethnicity' is favoured in some places, including Australia, as it is perceived to be a less historically loaded term that avoids the connotations of biological difference associated with race. We prefer the term race both because it engages with international literature and because we believe it is useful to remain cognisant of the biological history of race that we can never entirely escape. This paper uses the word 'white' to refer to people who are socially attributed as white and who receive white privilege in their everyday lives. Historically groups such as the Irish and Jews have 'become' white, and some argue that Asians are becoming white.

Karen Brodkin, *How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says About Race in America*, Chapel Hill, NC: Rutgers University Press, 1998; Richard Dyer, *White: Essays on Race and Culture*, London: Routledge, 1997; Ruth Frankenberg, *White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993; Noel Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White*, London: Routledge, 1995; Aileen Moreton-Robinson, *Whitening Race: Essays in Social and Cultural Criticism*, Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2004; and Min Zhou, 'Are Asian Americans Becoming White?' *Context* 3(1), 2004, pp 29–37.

34. Lisa A Cooper, Debra L Roter, Rachel L Johnson, Daniel E Ford, Donald M Steinwachs, and Neil R Powe, 'Patient-centered Communication, Ratings of Care, and Concordance of Patient and Physician Race', *Annals of Internal Medicine* 139(11), 2003, pp 907–915.
35. Whitney N Laster Pirtle and Tony N Brown, 'Inconsistency Within Expressed and Observed Racial Identifications: Implications for Mental Health Status', *Sociological Perspectives* 59(3), 2016, pp 582–603.
36. We note that our descriptive use of the term 'misrecognition' to stand for 'incorrect recognition' somewhat differs from Taylor's use of the term. He uses it to denote both the act of incorrect recognition and its potential negative effects: the 'real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves'. We do not mean to imply that misrecognition is not harmful, but that this aspect of misrecognition is less relevant to our argument as we focus on instances where the victims of misrecognition actively reject and subvert it. Charles Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', in *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition*, Charles Taylor and Amy Guttman (eds), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994, p 25.
37. Camille G Rich, 'Elective Race: Recognizing Race Discrimination in the Era of Racial Self-identification', *The Georgetown Law Journal* 102, 2014, p 1505.
38. Circe Sturm, *Becoming Indian: The Struggle over Cherokee Identity in the Twenty-first Century*, New Mexico: School for Advanced Research Press, 2010.
39. Bennett, 'Developing Identity'.
40. Mary A Pember, 'Ethnic Fraud?' *Diverse: Issues in Higher Education* 23(25), 2007, pp 20–23.
41. Christine Overall, 'Transsexualism and "Transracialism"', *Social Philosophy Today* 20, 2004, pp 183–193.
42. John Gardiner-Garden, 'Defining Aboriginality in Australia', Current Issues Brief No. 10 2002-03, Department of the Parliamentary Library: Canberra, 2003. The third aspect of Australian state definitions of indigeneity—community acceptance—is crucial in debates about Indigenous identity but beyond the scope of this paper because we do not engage with questions of authenticity. That is, we are not concerned with adjudicating whether people who claim to be Indigenous are 'really' Indigenous or not.
43. We also recognise that race discordance does not encompass all situations: cases where people alter their appearance to match their personal identity, such as Dolezal's, may not be racially discordant. Although, because she is a light-skinned, blue-eyed black woman, she may experience race discordance when she encounters people who do not think she appears authentically 'black'.
44. Heather Crawford, *Identity and Experience of Discrimination among Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders*, Canberra: Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research Seminar Series, 2015.
45. Miri Song and Peter Aspinall, 'Is Racial Mismatch a Problem for Young "Mixed Race" People in Britain? The Findings of Qualitative Research', *Ethnicities* 12(6), 2012, pp 730–753.
46. For example, Marcia A Dawkins, *Clearly Invisible: Racial Passing and the Color of Cultural Identity*, Waco: Baylor University Press, 2012.
47. Evan S Poata-Smith, 'Emergent Identities: The Changing Contours of Indigenous Identities in Aotearoa/New Zealand', in *The Politics of Identity: Emerging Indigeneity,* Michelle Harris, Martin Nakata, and Bronwyn Carlson (eds), Sydney: UTSePress, 2013, p 39.
48. Michelle Harris, Bronwyn Carlson, and Evan S Poata-Smith, 'Indigenous Identities and the Politics of Authenticity' in *The Politics of Identity: Emerging Indigeneity*, Michelle Harris, Martin Nakata, and Bronwyn Carlson (eds), Sydney: UTSePress, 2013, pp 1–9.

49. Avril Bell, *Relating Indigenous and Settler Identities: Beyond Domination*, Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
50. A P Elkin, *Citizenship for the Aborigines: A National Aboriginal Policy*, Sydney: Australasian Publishing Company, 1944 and Norman B Tindale, *Survey of the Half-caste Problem in South Australia*, Adelaide: Royal Geographical Society, 1941.
51. Commonwealth of Australia, 'Aboriginal Welfare: Initial Conference of Commonwealth and State Aboriginal Authorities Held at Canberra', 21–23rd April 1937, Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, p 11.
52. Warwick Anderson, *The Cultivation of Whiteness: Science, Health and Racial Destiny in Australia*, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2002, p 227.
53. Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Census of Population and Housing: Understanding the Increase in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Counts*, Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013.
54. Bennett, 'Developing Identity' and Yuriko Yamanouchi, 'Kinship, Organisations and "Wannabes": Aboriginal Identity Negotiation in South-western Sydney', *Oceania* 80(2), 2010, pp 216–228.
55. Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Estimates and Projections, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians, 2001 to 2026*, Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2014.
56. Identifying as Indigenous is not a choice for many light-skinned Indigenous people who live in small communities where their family is well-known. For these people, light skin leaves them vulnerable to racism from non-Indigenous people on the basis of their known indigeneity and to racism from (non-)Indigenous people due to perceived inauthenticity. As in this example from Anita Heiss, identity is imposed at the same time as it is denied: 'You're an abo, but you're only half-caste because your father is white'. Anita Heiss, *Am I Black Enough for You?* North Sydney: Bantam, 2012.
57. Celeste Liddle, *Fair-skin Privilege? I'm Sorry, but Things are Much More Complicated Than That*, 2014. Available at: http://blackfeministranter.blogspot.com.au/2014/03/fair-skin-privilege-im-sorry-but-things.html (accessed 2 February, 22 March).
58. Simpson, *Mohawk Interruptus*, pp 15–22.
59. Pamela C Chisum, 'Becoming Visible in Invisible Space: How the Cyborg Trickster Is (Re)inventing American Indian (NDN) Identity', Doctor of Philosophy Thesis, Washington State University, 2013, p 113.
60. Bonita Lawrence, *'Real' Indians and Others: Mixed-blood Urban Native Peoples and Indigenous Nationhood*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004, p 181.
61. This is the case with Tracey McIntosh, who writes that 'Being of fair complexion means that … my persistence to identify as Maori is seen by some (non-Maori) as a form of romantic stubbornness while for others it is seen as merely perverse'. Tracey McIntosh, 'Contested Realities: Race, Gender and Public Policy in Aotearoa/New Zealand'. Paper prepared for the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) Conference on Racism and Public Policy, Durban, NC, September 2001.
62. Sara Ahmed, 'A Phenomenology of Whiteness', *Feminist Theory*, 8(2), 2007, pp 149–168 and Frankenberg, *White Women, Race Matters*.
63. Alison Bailey, 'On White Shame and Vulnerability', *South African Journal of Philosophy*, 30 (4), 2011, pp 472–483; Robin DiAngelo, 'White Fragility', *International Journal of Critical Pedagogy* 3(3), 2011, pp 54–70; and Emma Kowal, 'The Stigma of White Privilege: Australian Anti-racists and Indigenous Improvement', *Cultural Studies*, 2(3), 2011, pp 313–333.
64. Lawrence, *'Real' Indians and Others*, p 179.
65. Paul Gilroy, *Against Race: Imagining Political Culture Beyond the Color Line*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.
66. Kelly F Jackson, 'Living the Multiracial Experience: Shifting Racial Expressions, Resisting Race, and Seeking Community', *Qualitative Social Work* 11(1), 2012, pp 42–60.
67. Rich, 'Elective Race'.
68. Simpson, *Mohawk Interruptus*, p 24 and Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*.
69. Simpson, *Mohawk Interruptus*, p 177.

70. Adam Kuper, 'The Return of the Native', *Current Anthropology* 44(3), 2003, pp 389–402.
71. Elizabeth Povinelli, *The Cunning of Recognition: Indigenous Alterities and the Making of Australian Multiculturalism*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002.
72. Carole McGranahan, 'Theorizing Refusal: An Introduction', *Cultural Anthropology* 31(3), 2016, pp 319–325 and Markell, Patchen, *Bound by Recognition*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003.

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